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Examining the social consequences of innovation has surprisingly been neglected in labour 
science and employment policy until recently. Most exceptions can, however, be found in the 
literature on national innovation system initiated by the Scandinavian model. Apart from 
them, there are various theoretical and empirical analyses stressing the impact of 
technological advancement on destroying workplaces on the one extreme, and innovation 
mystified as a panacea for all problems, on the other. The more balanced evaluations 
somewhere between the two are relatively rare. The significance of the topic was further 
enhanced by two recent events. The ten-year strategy of the European Union accepted in 2010 
placed smart, inclusive and sustainable growth in the centre of its development policy 
(European Commission, 2010). Of these objectives smart is the almost permanent 
characteristic of the most modern technological development, inclusivity obviously refers to 
widening social inequalities, while sustainability draws attention to considering the 
environmental and socio-economic impacts of human activity.  In connection with this, the 
2014 publication ’Employment and Social Development in Europe’ by the European 
Commission explicitly stresses ‘the significance of labour quality and labour organisation in 
the intelligent and inclusive growth while discussing the future of labour’ (European 
Commission, 2015:137). 
Another related factor that has drawn attention in the industrial, agricultural and 
service sectors relates to examining the social impacts of technological changes caused by 
automation, digitalisation and robotisation.  
The ’Quality of Jobs and Innovation Generated Employment Outcomes’ (QuInnE)3 
project supported by EU Horizon 2020 research programme analyses these correlations by 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods simultaneously. The objective of the research 
is the joint analysis and assessment of innovation with the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of employment. A separate analysis was carried out on the 20-year development of the 
European and national innovation strategies on the basis of which we surprisingly concluded 
that the social aspects of innovation do not only appear in public policy with the exception of 
North Europe and some Continental, as well as Anglo-Saxon countries, which restricts the 
scope of these policies to a great extent (Makó – Illéssy – Warhurst, 2016). 
                                                 
1 In: Simai Mihály – Lukács Eszter (szerk.) Az ENSZ jövője a széteső világban, Budapest: Magyar ENSZ 
Társaság, 47 – 59. o.  
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Our study presents the complex social impacts of technological innovations through 
the example of automation by using American, European and Hungarian quantitative 
analyses. Our paper is structured as follows. The first part shortly reviews the history of 
automation and the second part deals with the effects on automation on jobs and working task 
structures. The third part tackles the so-called ’skill-biased’ technological changes while 
concentrating on the European processes. The topic of the fourth part is the European 
comparison of work forms before and immediately after the 2008 credit crunch. Finally, in 
addition to the summary the most important research challenges of the future are forecast. 
 
 
The history of automation 
 
The pessimistic forecast of the negative impact of technological changes on employment, the 
so-called ‘automation anxiety’ has significant traditions in social sciences.4 John Maynard 
Keynes (1931) signalled technological unemployment as the new disease of economic 
development in the first third of the 20th century. Moreover, he also drew attention to the 
possibility that countries lagging behind in development may find themselves in a more 
disadvantaged situation in the long term while the hardships of adapting to technological 
changes are temporary. Leontief (1952) represents a more pessimistic view when he states 
that work will become less important in the future; machines can replace more and more 
workers although the new industries that would be able to employ the redundant labour force 
did not appear at that time. 
While changes in the labour are always in flux, for nearly half a century forecasts on 
technological changes resulting in mass unemployment did not come true. The employment 
problems accompanying new techniques and technological unemployment were regarded as 
temporary, short term hardships of adaptation. In addition, failures also signalled the barriers 
hidden in the opportunities of automation. For instance, in the 1980’s Volkswagen launched 
its project known as ‘Halle 54’ that was announced as the ‘automated factory’ of the future 
and within which Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM). However, the experiment failed 
as the number of car rejects increased enormously and repairing them made the factory 
uneconomical. By the end of the 1980’s attempts to totally automating production were halted 
and solutions to entirely phase out the human factor failed. According to Hack and Pfeiffer (in 
Kopp et al., 2016) the unsuccessful VW attempt for radical automation was mentioned as the 
guinea pig of the narrow minded technological aspect of rationalisation and modernisation 
where every work organisation is interpreted as technological. In their opinion, this approach 
also reached its limits similarly to Taylorism in the past. The basic reason for both failures is 
that their rationalising strategy was based on the radical questioning of human centred work 
organisation (Hack, 1994; Pfeiffer, 2010; in: Kopp – Howaldt – Schultze, 2016). The big 
issue has remained unchanged since then: to what extent can human labour be cut out of the 
production processes or organising services?  
With the advent of intelligent robots, driverless cars, 3D printing, etc., we again can 
witness the resurrection of views on technological replacement causing unemployment, or, 
more generally, automation anxiety (Brynjolfsson – McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015). 
Nevertheless, in contrast with previous views experts of various forms of digitalisation stress 
                                                 
4 However, it is important to point out now that although automation and digitalisation are used interchangeably, 
they slightly differ in content. In a stricter sense, automation is a phenomenon when manpower is replaced by 
machines for the same task. Digitalisation, on the other hand, means the process when sensors and other digital 
instruments are used to transform certain processes of production or logistics into digitally conveyable and 
processable forms. What they have in common is the use the efficiencies of digital technologies; so 
consequently, their impact on work and employment is similar in many cases. 
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that nowadays and particularly in the future, robots will be partners and not enemies of man. 
Estimates vary on the impact of technological changes on employment. Andrea Szalavetz 
(2018) likens these competing prophecies that envisage a proximate employment disaster to a 
‘numbers war’. For instance, according to Frey and Osborne (2015) in the USA almost half of 
the employees (47%) will be replaced by computers and algorithms in the forthcoming one or 
two decades. Bowles (2014) states that 45-60% of the jobs in Europe will be automated. 
Experts say that within Europe more than every second (59%) job of the German economy is 
threatened by the risk of automation (Brzeski – Burk, 2015). 
The most recent analyses draw attention to the more differentiated consequences of the 
impacts of automation and robotisation on employment and also reject the scenarios that 
represent and simplify radical changes. For example, one of the most recent researches of the 
internationally renowned consultancy firm, McKinsey & Company, which analysed more 
than two thousand activities of nearly 800 jobs in the USA, found that in the following decade 
automation will result in the total disappearance of very few jobs. Instead, a thorough 
transformation is underway affecting all jobs to a greater or smaller extent regardless the tasks 
at work (Chui – Manyika – Miremadi, 2016). The most recent analysis on OECD 21 (Arntz – 
Gregory – Zierhan, 2016) drew very similar conclusions to the previous research, in contrast 
to Frey and Osborne (2015)’s estimation (47%) only one-tenth (9%) of the jobs in America 
are likely to be made extinct by the digital revolution. 
 
 
A more differentiated approach to the impacts of automation: substitution or 
supplement? 
 
Throughout the sciences, different methodologies for analysis often lead to varied, sometimes 
conflicting results. The field of labour sciences is no different, but domineering concepts can 
be distinguished. The first is to survey the presence of information-communication 
technologies (ICT) in certain industries or jobs and based on these data estimates are forecast 
for the further development of these technologies and their future impact on employment. A 
more differentiated approach surveys exposure to automation/digitalisation on the level of 
typical tasks at work, from which aggregated estimates can be made. Our paper deals with the 
latter one in detail.  
One of the most significant analyses on this topic was carried out by David H. Autor 
(2014), an economist of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) who interpreted the 
possible impacts of automation on the level of tasks at work. Michael Polanyi’s work was 
used as a theoretical framework. The internationally renowned scientist of Hungarian origin 
in researching the structure of personal knowledge came to the conclusion that we know more 
than we can tell in words while examining the role of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966). 
Polanyi made a difference between two main groups of human knowledge: explicit 
knowledge that can easily be codified and transferred formally and tacit (personal) knowledge 
that are hard or impossible to codify. Autor (2014) divided jobs into three large groups while 
examining the proportion of explicit and tacit knowledge elements necessary to perform 
duties: abstract-intensive, routine-intensive and manual-intensive physical jobs. According to 
his argument, these three groups are exposed to the danger of automation to different extents. 
‘Given their ubiquity, it is tempting to infer that there is no task to which computers are not 
suited. But that leap of logic is unfounded. Human tasks that have proved most amenable to 
computerization are those that follow explicit, codification procedures – such as 
multiplication – where computers now vastly exceed human labour in speed, quality, 
accuracy, and cost efficiency. Tasks that have proved most vexing to automate are those that 
demand flexibility, judgment, and common sense – skills that we understand only tacitly – for 
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example, developing a hypothesis or organizing a closet. In these tasks, computers are often 
less sophisticated than preschool age children’ (Autor, 2014: 129). 
After distinguishing three groups Autor started to examine American employment 
statistics and tried to fit the ten non-agricultural main groups into his typology of three. The 
first category includes managerial positions, and jobs that require higher education 
qualification or secondary school certificate that offer higher salary in general and call for a 
high level of vocational education. Autor classifies employees in sales, office work and 
administration, production, assembling, repairing and other jobs that require manual skills in 
the second category. They are typically white collar jobs with secondary education where the 
proportion of women is high and also some blue collar jobs filled in by men with typically 
secondary or lower education The third group of jobs include security, the professions of 
personal assistance, cleaning, hospitality etc. These are jobs that offer lower salary and/or 
require lower education level. According to Autor digitalisation primarily threatens jobs in the 
second category as they are the tasks that can be routinized the most.  
Afterwards, Autor analysed the employment trends of the United States from 1979 in 
three employment groups. Data justify his hypothesis according to which the proportion of 
those employed in the second category has been decreasing historically. While these 
employment statistics are nearly four decades old, they show typical hollowing out in the 
second group, i.e. the white collar positions with secondary education and blue collar jobs 
with secondary or lower education level. A similar trend can be traced down from the 
European employment data as well. According to Autor, this decrease can partly by explained 
by increasing automation and digitalisation. 
However, the impact of automation is not merely destruction, i.e. phasing out jobs; 
rather, it prevails in a more complex way. ‘The fact that a task cannot be computerized does 
not imply that computerization has no effect on that task. On the contrary: tasks that cannot be 
substituted by computerization are generally complemented by it. This point is as 
fundamental as it is overlooked’ (Autor, 2014: 136). In these case digitalization does not have 
a direct impact on employment but obviously it influences job quality. As can be seen, the 
impact of automation prevails via a more complex mechanism that cannot be simplified 
merely as anxiety and fear of technological unemployment that returns from time to time. 
Autor’s analysis shows that within four decades we would see substantial employment 
polarisation, i.e. the growing number of those in high education with high wage jobs, and low 
education with low wage jobs, and a hollowing out in the middle where a significant 
reduction can statistically be noticed. 
 
 
The European scenario: do technological changes result in polarisation or the 
general increase of education level? 
 
However, not everyone agrees with the polarisation argument. Fernández-Macías, Hurley and 
Bisello (2016) in their study published with the support of the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) have examined the possible 
impact of automation on the European employment structure. By analysing the literature on 
employment shifts generated by technological development they concluded that there are two 
wider-scale approaches within it: skill-biased vs. routine-biased technological change. The 
former one appreciates education and contributes the employment tendencies of the past 
decades to skill upgrading while the latter one (including Autor’s analysis) envisages the 
decreasing significance of routine tasks and analyses the same data within the theoretical 
framework of employment polarisation and looks for proofs of justification. ‘With upgrading 
employment shifts, the expected pattern is a more or less linear improvement in employment 
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structure, with the greatest employment growth in high-paid (or high-skilled) jobs, the 
weakest growth in low-paid (or low-skilled) jobs, and middling growth in the middle. With 
polarisation, the main difference is that the relative positions, in terms of employment 
dynamics of the middle and bottom levels of the job distribution, are swapped: employment 
growth is weakest in the middle and relatively stronger at both ends of the job–wage 
distribution, leading to a “hollowed middle” (Fernández-Macías – Hurley – Bisello, 2016: 
11).  
This polarisation effect has prevailed in the European, small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) sector: ‘The crisis period of 2008–2010 was characterised by significant 
job loss in Europe (…). The overall trend towards job polarisation could also be observed for 
SMEs, with a lower level of job loss among the lowest-paid and highest-paid jobs compared 
with the medium wage categories’ (Mandle et al., 2016: 19). A similar trend is noted in the 
most recent IMF review, which concludes that it is the service sector (financial services, 
public administration, healthcare, education) that is worst affected by polarisation. There are 
signs that more detailed data will need to confirm that polarisation is the most powerful in the 
sectors most exposed to technological changes (International Monetary Fund, 2017). 
In order to obtain a more accurate picture about the European employment shifts after 
the financial and economic crisis (2008) than the too general analyses available, Fernández-
Macías, Hurley and Bisello (2016) combined the approach of employment groups with 
industrial analyses so their basic unit of observation were jobs within specific industries. They 
were then classified into quintiles on the basis of average salaries so that the employment 
level could be examined before, during and after the crisis. Due to the constraints of the study 
neither methodology nor the results after the analysis can be presented in details so only the 
three most important statements for us are briefed. 
 First, according to the authors the European employment trends have always been 
characterised by the simultaneous presence of skill upgrading and polarisation, 
although their extent has been changing dynamically throughout the years. Before the 
crisis, upgrading skills dominated while polarisation also took place although with a 
residual value. As an aftermath of the global economic crisis, polarisation obviously 
increased while employment was also rising in the jobs of the upper quintile so 
upgrading also prevailed. The most recent phenomenon (from the second quarter of 
2013 to the second quarter of 2015) was a well-balanced employment increase with a 
minimum shift to higher skilled jobs. For the time being, there is no sign of lowering 
skill demand on an aggregate European level but it also holds true, however, that the 
increase of the level demanded is much less obvious than in the years before the crisis 
(Fernández-Macías – Hurley – Bisello, 2016). 
 Second, though the most recent trends of employment shift are less compatible with 
skills upgrade than before the crisis, skill downgrade was obvious only in two 
countries. ‘Over the four-year period 2011–2015, Hungary and Italy both experienced 
an obvious downgrading pattern of employment shift. In each of these countries, 
employment growth was strongest in the lowest-paid jobs and weaker in higher-paid 
jobs (…). At aggregate EU level over 2011–2015, there was upgrading with some 
polarisation – relatively faster growth in the bottom than in the middle. However, this 
involved a more even spread of job gains across the wage distribution, as employment 
growth accelerated from mid-2013 onwards’ (Fernández-Macías – Hurley – Bisello, 
2016: 13). 
 Third, while the greatest growth was produced by the service sector, employment was 
also increasing in some areas of the processing industry, such as in food processing or 
in car manufacturing, which is of special importance in Hungary. Moreover, in these 




Automation and creativity  
 
The labour science community still lacks consensus on whether the overall impacts of 
automation are positive or it supports the more problematic polarisation argument that 
generates social conflicts. We have reason to suppose that whether a county gains or loses 
depends on its institutional context. If automation supplements or makes human labour easier 
by letting them concentrate on the most important tasks, it also means a greater role of 
creativity, particularly in countries where the altered technological conditions were properly 
anticipated by, for example, restructuring education and trainings, drafting new innovation 
political objectives, developing labour relations or renewing public administration/the public 
sector. The opposite case may also hold true. Where challenges of disruptive technological 
breakthroughs have resulted in radical changes compared to the previous technological 
paradigm and changes have been inadequately managed or with some delay such as 
automation, it is likely negative impacts will substantially outweigh the positive ones.  
In the global labour marketplace, however, counties do not have equal chances or a 
level playing field, so we can presume that in countries that are well positioned in the global 
economy centre conditions have greater ability for transforming the political, social and 
economic systems, while those on the periphery will suffer. We also have to note that 
identifying and implementing responses to the challenges of digitalisation also mean a special 
and historic challenge for the economically developed, capitalist countries in the centre. In 
this process, dialogue with the social and economic stakeholders is of vital importance. For 
instance, the most recent British governmental reviews stress the importance of further 
trainings that impact one million employees in maintaining long-term economic 
competitiveness (Made Smarter, 2017). The British analysis also draws attention to the fact 
that ‘the pace of change unleashed by digitalisation means that around two-thirds of children 
in primary school today will work in jobs which do not even exist yet’ (Made Smarter, 2017: 
75). 
In another study of ours to be published soon the experienced trends on the labour 
market are analysed (Makó – Illéssy – Borbély, 2018). To this end, data of several European 
Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) were analysed. The survey is based on interviews of 
almost forty thousand European employees that is carried out every five years (Eurofound, 
2015). Part of the survey instrument focuses on identifying cognitive parts of working 
conditions as well as the autonomy level of employees. These two dimensions are especially 
important to identify the level of exposedness to automation as on the basis of Autor (2014), 
who suggested that till machines do not learn to study, only activities whose rules can 
relatively easily be programmed can be automated such as the ones based on transparent, 
explicit routines and do not require human interactions in ad hoc situations.   
The novel feature of our present study in comparison with the above mentioned one is 
that since then the results of the 2015 survey were also analysed and compared with the 2005 
data. Among the respondents, those who are not employees (such as the unemployed or 
housewives) are disregarded, together with those employed by an organisation with fewer 
than 10 employees. Employees of some of the sectors of agriculture, fishery and the public 
sector (education, healthcare) are not included, either. To be simple and brief, the data of 
Malta and Cyprus are not listed separately in the tables but as part of the European average. 
On the basis of Lorenz and Lundvall (2010), the following six variables have been used to 
identify the cognitive dimensions of work tasks and the level of employee autonomy: i) the 
importance of problem solving ability at work, ii) the opportunity for studying new things, iii) 
the complexity of work tasks, iv) the possibility of using ideas at work, v) the level of 
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autonomy in selecting working methods, and vi) the order of work tasks (the detailed 
methodology is included in the original article, Makó – Illéssy – Borbély, 2018). 
As the result of the cluster analysis three larger groups of employees could be 
distinguished. The creative workers consist of employees who have to make use of their 
cognitive abilities at work to a large extent and they enjoy a large degree of autonomy. The 
jobs organised on the principles of Taylor represented the other end of the scale where 
utilising cognitive abilities and autonomy were the least typical. Between these two groups 
constrained problem solvers can be found whose work is characterised by relatively high 
cognitive expectancies and an extremely low level of autonomy. We assume on the basis of 
the above that the Taylorean employees are the most affected by automation while the job of 
creative workers and to a slighter extent, constrained problem solvers is less dramatically 
affected by the processes of automation. 
When analysing the changes in the EU-27 average it can be seen that within the 
examined ten years hardly any changes may be experienced in the single jobs. Almost one 
quarter of the European employees have jobs defined as the jobs of constrained problem 
solvers5 and half of them have creative jobs. As can be seen from Table 1 the stable European 
average covers significant differences and dynamics between the country groups. Not 
surprisingly, most creative jobs can proportionally be found in the Scandinavian countries. 
Almost three quarters of the jobs significantly rely on the cognitive abilities of the employees 
and ensures high level of autonomy. Their proportion was also increasing in Denmark and 
Finland of the three countries during the examined ten years, while in Sweden the proportion 
was decreasing but originally it was the highest there. In parallel, the proportion of the 
Taylorean jobs is the lowest in Europe and it was significantly decreasing or levelled off in 
Sweden between 2005 and 2015.  
 
Table 1.  




CW CPS TW CW CPS TW 
Nordic countries 
Denmark 74 13 13 77 14 9 
Finland 67 20 13 73 18 9 
Sweden 80 10 10 74 15 11 
Continental countries 
Austria 51 29 20 57 25 19 
Belgium 56 20 23 59 19 21 
                                                 
5 Although it is not noted separately but it is important to stress that it is not the employees but the jobs that are 
characterised as creative or Taylorean. An under-skilled employee can also have a creative job like, 
unfortunately, a lot of highly qualified professionals have less creative jobs. Our analysis is trying to highlight 
that examining how innovative work organisations are, to what extent they utilise their employees’ knowledge 
and how they motivate them to improve and share their knowledge are as important issues as the education level 
of the employees.  
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France 59 19 21 62 24 14 
Netherlands 72 16 13 63 16 21 
Luxemburg 63 18 19 65 24 11 
Germany 51 25 24 49 23 29 
Mediterranean countries 
Greece 40 32 28 28 32 40 
Italy 40 28 33 45 16 38 
Portugal 42 24 34 41 28 31 
Spain 37 28 35 47 28 25 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
Ireland 58 19 22 55 21 24 
United Kingdom 50 20 30 59 21 20 
EU-27 50 24 26 52 24 24 
Source: Own calculation. Legend: CW = Creative workers; CPS = Constrained problem-
solvers; TW= Taylorized workers.  
 
The Continental country group shows a much more heterogeneous picture. A bit 
surprisingly, Germany stands out of this cluster with its downward position as the number of 
creative jobs does not reach 50% while the share of the Taylorean ones is nearly 30%. The 
proportion of the latter one is the lowest in Luxembourg, almost at the level of the 
Scandinavian countries that can be explained by its developed financial sector. A great 
difference in comparison with the Nordic countries is that the proportion of the constrained 
problem solvers here is much larger. Approximately the extent to which more people work in 
jobs with restricted autonomy is the same as fewer people who work in creative jobs and the 
same holds true for France. In the case of the Netherlands similarly to Germany this 
difference obviously results in the higher proportion of the Taylorean jobs. This is noteworthy 
as in 2005 the Netherlands was still closer to the Scandinavian county group than the 
Continental. However, the years of the crisis have brought a radical change but, unfortunately, 
in the negative direction.6 In contrast, the proportion of creative jobs in Austria has 
significantly increased. 
The period of the crisis also launched convergent processes in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries within the cluster. In 2005 58% of the jobs in Ireland were creative which decreased 
to 55% by 2015. In contrast, during the same period in the United Kingdom this ratio 
increased from 50% to 59%. Interestingly, this significant growth exclusively impaired the 
Taylorean jobs while the proportion of the constrained problem solvers did not change. 
Numerically, it means that in the United Kingdom the number of the least creative jobs 
decreased from 30% to 20% within 10 years.  
                                                 
6 To decide what role the crisis, the technical changes’ gaining ground or a third factor played in these changes 
are beyond the limitations of the study. Our paper makes a reference to the crisis as it is obvious that such shocks 
do have an impact on jobs, especially the creative dimension of work tasks and the extent of employees’ 
autonomy.  
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Not surprisingly, the proportion of creative jobs is the lowest in the Mediterranean 
countries. It is more interesting; however, that most of these countries could catch up with the 
EU-27 average during the crisis. Spain takes the lead where the proportion of creative work 
increased from 37% to 47%, but in Italy their share also grew from 40% to 45%. In Portugal 
their proportion did not change. Only in Greece was it dramatically reduced from 40% to 
28%.7 In parallel, the proportion of the Taylorean jobs was strikingly high, not only in 
comparison with the old member states but also most post-socialist countries The two ends 
are represented by Spain and Greece, respectively. The proportion of the least creative jobs 
decreased by 10 percent in the former one and increased by 12 percent in the latter one. 
Another interesting fact is that in Italy not only did the proportion of the most innovative jobs 
increase but the least innovative ones did as well at the same time period between 2005 and 
2015.  
The group of the Post-Socialist countries also shows a very interesting and varied 
picture (Table 2). Estonia stands out of the North Eastern European counties, i.e. the Baltic 
countries as the high ratio of creative jobs and the general distribution of job types are similar 
to the more developed countries of the Continental cluster. Lithuania is in the middle as less 
than half of the jobs are creative and the rest is evenly distributed among the other two types 
of jobs. The case of Latvia is really surprising since in this aspect it is one of the least 
developed countries of the EU, although it was one of the leaders of the region in 2005. While 
2010 data are not included in the table, it is worth remarking that the country strengthened its 
position at that time and the drastic decrease occurred in the last 5 years.  
 
Table 2.  





CW CPS TW CW CPS TW 
                                                 
7 The latter one also signals that in addition to the technological changes the crisis also played a great role in 
forming clusters at work. 
56 
North Eastern Europe 
Estonia 57 25 19 62 21 18 
Latvia 52 19 29 35 17 48 
Lithuania 39 30 31 45 28 27 
East Central Europe 
Czech Republic 43 30 27 38 32 30 
Poland 46 32 22 41 30 29 
Hungary 44 29 27 37 30 33 
Slovakia 37 32 31 35 35 31 
Slovenia 52 24 24 55 26 19 
South Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 40 30 29 38 34 28 
Romania 37 39 24 35 37 28 
EU-27 50 24 26 52 24 24 
Source: Own calculation. Legend: CW = Creative workers; CPS = Constrained problem-
solvers; TW = Taylorized workers.  
 
The Visegrad countries and Slovenia were termed as the Central European countries 
although the latter one significantly differs from the others regarding innovative jobs. The 
55% of creative jobs is similar to the Anglo-Saxon countries and makes Slovenia outstanding 
of this country group similarly to Estonia. What is striking in connection with the countries of 
the region is that in all the four member countries the ratio of creative jobs decreased. 
Unfortunately, this decrease was the strongest in Hungary from 44% to 37%. Another cause 
for concern is that Hungary is the only one of the five countries where the proportion of the 
least innovative, Taylorean jobs exceeds those of the constrained problem solvers, whose 
autonomy is minimal but where the knowledge of the employees is crucial. The ratio of these 
jobs was increased by 6 percent within ten years. The situation in Poland is similar. The 
creative jobs’ losing ground is due to the increase in the Taylorean jobs. The weaker position 
of the Visegrad countries resulted in the fact that two South-Eastern European member states, 
i.e. Romania and Bulgaria, could further erode innovative jobs. All this was achieved, while 
the ratio of creative jobs overall did not increase, with the decrease being to a much smaller 
extent such as, e.g. in Hungary.  
 
 
Summary and challenges for future research  
 
The further gaining ground of info-communication technologies in production and services 
has drawn attention to examining the social impacts of technological changes again. During 
the commencing years of ’automation anxiety’ generated by automation, digitalisation and 
robotisation, menacing forecasts have projected the disappearance of complete jobs. The 
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second generation of reviews have concluded more differentiated findings. In parallel, 
researchers have started to concentrate on the content of work tasks instead of job groups and 
make estimations of how many employees are endangered by automation. This has also 
involved the survey of jobs where automation does not substitute but rather complements 
human work by making a more differentiated analysis possible. 
From this aspect the work of David H. Autor (2014) is of special importance. Autor 
has worked out a useful theoretical framework on the basis of Michael Polanyi’s paradox, 
analysing job groups to assess the impact of automation on the content of work tasks. As he 
argues, the jobs that will defy automation are the ones that mainly require tacit knowledge. 
Two main groups of jobs belong here: work tasks that call for manual skills and high level of 
abstraction. Routinised jobs represent the other side that, either intellectual or physical ones, 
can easily be replaced by computers or robots.  
Relying on the results of the European working condition survey, we wanted to 
analyse to what extent countries of the European Union are exposed to automation, and 
whether the danger of phasing out a great number of jobs as a result of technological changes 
could occur. Two dimensions of the content of the work tasks in the database were analysed 
on cognitive or learning potential and employees’ autonomy. On the basis of this three job 
clusters could be differentiated: creative jobs with a high level of studying ability and 
autonomy, Taylorean jobs that require a low level studying ability and autonomy and 
constrained problems solvers’ jobs that call for a high level of learning potential and an 
extremely low autonomy level. The results of 2005 and 2015 database were analysed with the 
following most important findings: 
1) Although the job cluster patterns of the EU-27 average have hardly been changed in 
the examined ten-year period, significant differences exist between countries and 
important shifts may be monitored.  
2) Of the European countries, the proportion of the creative jobs is the highest and the 
ratio of the Taylorean jobs is the lowest in the Scandinavian countries followed by the 
members of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon country groups. The Mediterranean and 
the East Central European post-socialist countries are the tail-enders, the former ones 
in a bit more favourable position. 
3) From 2005 to 2015 a strong convergence could be detected within the Scandinavian, 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon country groups, while differences between the groups 
remained or even slightly increased. In contrast, a significant divergence could be 
noted within the Mediterranean and the Post-Socialist country groups.  
4) Estonia and Slovenia stand out of the countries where the ratio of creative jobs reaches 
the values of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon country groups. In contrast, the share 
of creative jobs significantly decreased in the Visegrad countries and occasionally 
approaches the level of Romania and Bulgaria that are considered as traditional tail-
enders.  
Strong negative tendencies prevail in Hungary. While 2010 data are not included in 
our tables it can clearly be seen from the results that the situation turned unfavourable then. In 
2010 the ratio of creative jobs was 48%, the Taylorean 23% respectively, and within five 
years the proportion of the former ones dropped to 37% while that of the latter ones increased 
to 33%. All these processes are a cause for concern as technological development may result 
in the automation exposedness of the Taylorean jobs. Hungary has based its economic 
competitiveness on cheap but skilled labour force and its geographical proximity to the centre 
of Europe. This strategy was successful until the beginning of the 2000’s, but by the first half 
of the first decade of the new millennium the sources of further growth have been exhausted. 
With the exception of some significant examples, the Hungarian enterprises have been unable 
to attract activities of higher value added. There are signs that the segmented nature of the 
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Hungarian economy has increased in the past decades as internationally renowned companies 
producing and providing services for international markets, exist and operate side by side with 
small and medium sized enterprises living from the Hungarian market and the growing 
players of the state owned or partly state-owned sectors (Makó – Illéssy, 2016). The weak 
correlation between these three segments means a barrier to exploiting the economic 
opportunities of the country. Automation as a new source of danger must be taken into 
consideration when drafting the competitiveness strategy. For example, in the United 
Kingdom one of the explicit objectives of the strategy worked out to improve Industry 4.0 is 
to rebuild the industrial basis of the economy and relocate processing industry activities to the 
island from the low labour cost countries (Made Smarter, 2017: 8).  
If these scenarios come true, such changes may help in organising global value chains 
that can shake Hungary’s position in this field. Although the cheaper and more precise labour 
force of the Far East posed less serious threats to Hungarian jobs than expected, the German 
robots mean a much more realistic danger, with predominantly routine tasks in the production 
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